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NOTES
"THE DEFENDANT IS INSURED"
INTRODUCTION
The following article is an attempt to ascertain the Vir-
ginia rule in respect to the admissibility of the fact that a
defendant, in a tort action, is insured against loss, and the
effect of such admission in the presence of the jury.
The leading Virginia decisions covering this particular
problem are discussed in an effort to formulate with some
degree of clarity the rule and reasoning of the Virginia courts
in respect to this problem of evidence.
PROBLEM IN GENERAL
The vari6us states have taken conflicting views as to the
admissibility of evidence of the insurance coverage of a de-
fendant in a tort action. There are actually three views in
respect to this evidence problem. In some jurisdictions,
courts feel that such evidence is always admissible; as pointed
out by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on p. 671 of
Highway Express Lines v. Fldiming.1 It was there stated:
The Courts in other jurisdictions are divided as to
the admissibility of evidence establishing the fact
that a defendant in a tort action carries liability in-
surance. A few courts, among them Nebraska, take the
view that such evidence is always admissible. The rea-
soning of these courts may be summarized as follows:
The standard provisions of a liability insurance con-
tract require the insured to notify the insurance carrier
of the accident. Thereafter the carrier assumes full re-
sponsibility for the defense; sends its investigators to
view the scene of the accident and to interview the
witnesses; and employs attorney's who determine
whether to settle the case or defend a law suit. The
1 185 Va. 666, 40 S.E. 2d 294 (1946).
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insured is required to render the insurance company
only such assistance as it may demand. Actually, the
real defendant is the insurance carrier and this fact
should be known to the court and jury, otherwise the
court becomes a party to "benevolent judicial con-
cealment." If this class of evidence is not admitted,
then the presence and interest of the actual defendant
is never made known. The exclusion of such evidence is
incompatible with an open court and judgments openly
and publicly arrived at. To compel and permit such
proceedings is to countenance and participate in what
is tantamount to fraud.
Other jurisdictions hold that if the jury is informed that
defendant carries casualty insurance it is sufficient to warrant
the trial court awarding a mistrial. For example, in West Vir-
ginia, the jury should not in any manner be appraised of the
fact that the defendant owner in an action for the negligent
operation of an automobile is protected by indemnity in-
surance, and such action on the part of the plaintiff or his
counsel will ordinarily constitute reversible error, notwith-
standing the fact that the court may instruct the jury not to
consider the same in arriving at a verdict. 2
Virginia has not adopted this hard and fast rule. The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals feels that although it is
improper for the jury to be informed that a defendant is in-
sured against accident in an action for negligence against him,
such error under the particular circumstances of each case
can be harmless and therefore will not constitute grounds
for reversal if substantial justice has been done. The latest
and most significant Virginia decision laying down the Vir-
ginia rule in respect to this problem is the controversial case
of Simmons v. Boyd,3 decided in 1958. Before discussing this
decision in detail, it is important to review briefly the more
important prior cases by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals involving the admissibility of the insurance coverage.
2 Fleming v. Hartrick, 105 W. Va. 135, 141 S.E. 628 (1928).
3 199 Va. 806, 102 S.E. 2d 292 (1958).
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LEADING VIRGINIA CASES
On page 681 of Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Knight, 4
the Court quotes with approval the Supreme Court of Maine
in 90 Me. 368, as follows:
•.. to allow juries in cases of this kind to take into
consideration the fact that an employer has insured
against accident would do no more harm than good, and
would increase the already strong tendency of juries to
be influenced in cases of personal injury, especially
where a corporation is defendant, by sympathy and
prejudice.
This was a 1907 decision which helped formulate the
Virginia view that a jury with knowledge that a defendant in
a negligence action is insured against loss would give a verdict
for the plaintiff based on the fact that a corporation and
not the individual defendant would sustain the loss.
A 1923 decision, Rinehart & Dennis Co., Inc. v. Brown,=
discussed the insurance problem in great detail and did much
to lay down the present Virginia rule and the reasoning behind
it. In that case the plaintiff, a carpenter employed by the
defendant, a general contractor, was injured while attempting
to swing from the roof of one building to the roof of another
after a sudden storm had blown away the ladders of descent.
In the opening argument to the jury, the plaintiff's counsel
deliberately stated that the real defendant in the case was an
insurance company. The defendant objected and asked that
the jury be discharged. The Court refused to discharge the
jury but instructed it to disregard the statement of the plain-
tiff's counsel. Later, during the cross examination of one of
the defendant's witnesses, plaintiff's counsel asked if the
defendant was insured. The defendant again objected and the
court emphatically instructed the jury to disregard the question
and at the same time warned counsel for the plaintiff not to
4 106 Va. 674, 56 S.E. 725 (1907).
5 137 Va. 670, 120 S.E. 269 (1923).
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pursue that line of questioning. In the closing argument
the plaintiff's counsel again attempted to bring out the point
of the defendant's insurance. A judgment for the plaintiff
was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals which
made the following statement on page 676:
Generally a new trial will be denied where improper
argument has been checked by the court and the jury
has been instructed to disregard the improper state-
ments. If, however, counsel persists in such arguments
after the admonition of the court or if it appears that
the infavorable influence of the argument was probably
not wholly removed by the court's action, a new trial
may be allowed.
Another important statement was made on page 677 of
this same case when the court stated as follows:
In inadvertent cases, and cases where no serious harm
seems to have been probably done, we have given con-
trolling effect to the judgment of the trial court. [Em-
phasis added]
In this same case on page 679, the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals quoted with approval the Supreme Court of Kansas
in 19 Kan. 556, as follows:
... all that can be safely laid down is, that when-
ever in the exercise of a sound discretion it appears to
the court that the jury may have been influenced as to their
verdict by such extrinsic matters, however thoughtlessly or
innocently uttered, or that the statements were made by
counsel in a conscious and defiant disregard of his duty,
then the verdict should be set aside. [Emphasis added]
The words inadvertent and unintentional play an impor-
tant part in the Virginia rule on this problem and it should
be noted that in the Rinehart case the court stated that even
if the question of insurance was brought to the attention of
the jury innocently and there was evidence that they were
influenced by this improper evidence in deciding upon a
verdict, then the verdict should be set aside.
478
In the 1931 case of Lanham v. Bond,,, plaintiff's counsel
in his opening statement told the jury that he intended to
prove that the defendant had stated to the plaintiff at the time
of the accident that he had insurance and that the insurance
company would pay for all of the damages. The defendant
asked for but was refused a mistrial. The plaintiff then testi-
fied that the defendant had admitted fault on his part and
that his, the defendant's insurance company, would pay for
any damage. The defendant then admitted that he had said
he would have his insurance company take care of the matter
if he were at fault. The court instructed the jury to disregard
the matter of insurance coverage. The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that this evidence constituted error
regardless of the instructions. On page 175 the court stated,
quoting the Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, vol. 4, p. 1521:
The jury should not be informed of the fact that
the defendant in a negligent operation of an automobile
is protected by indemnity insurance, and such action
on the part of the plaintiff or his counsel will ordinarily
constitute reversible error, notwithstanding the court
may instruct the jury not to consider the same in arriving
at a verdict, at least if such information is given to the jury
by the deliberate and premeditated purpose and design of
counsel. [Emphasis added]
In this case the court also pointed out that it has been
argued that evidence that the defendant in a negligence action
had casualty insurance should be admissible based on the
fact that the awareness of such insurance might cause the
owner to operate his car recklessly and regardless of the conse-
quences. But this argtiment was rejected since it is in the
best interest of the public for automobile owners to be in-
sured for the benefit of others and observation and experience
have shown that the responsible and prudent purchase automo-
bile insurance.
In the 1934 case of Irvine v. Carr,7 counsel for plaintiff
accidentally brought out the fact that the defendant was
6 157 Va. 167, 160 S.E. 89 (1931).
7 163 Va. 662, 177 S.E. 208 (1934).
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insured. The court held that in this case there had been a
fair trial on the merits and that the mere mention of the insurance
coverage of the defendant, inadvertently, in itself, was not
sufficient error to warrant a mistrial. The court pointed out
that error which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties should be disregarded. This is based on Virginia's
doctrine of harmless error. Statute 8-487 of the Virginia Code
of 1950 states in part:
No judgment or decree shall be arrested or re-
versed: ... (8) For any other defect, imperfection, or
omission in the record, or for any error committed
on the trial when it plainly appears from the record
and the evidence given at the trial the parties have
had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice
has been reached ...
Norfolk, Etc. Belt Line v. Jones, 8 (1945) is an interesting de-
cision in view of the prior Virginia cases, which certainly
provided a method of circumventing the rule against the
admission of insurance coverage. The court on page 544
stated:
.. . The motion for judgment was brought in the
name of T. Helm Jones, administrator of the estate of
Albert H. Reynard. On motion of the defendant, the
court ordered that the style of the plaintiff be amended
to read: 'T. Helm Jones, Administrator of the estate of
Albert H. Reynard, and for the benefit of American
Mutual Liability Ins. Co., as its interest may appear.'
Counsel for the plaintiff, in the opening statement
said that it was for the benefit of the widow and son.
That was the truth but not the whole truth: it was
also for the benefit of the insurance company. Ordi-
narily we keep from the jury the fact that the plaintiff
was insured, but we are of the opinion that one has a
right to tell the jury what the record shows. It might
be that a widow and child had received complete
pecuniary compensation. In such circumstances it
2 183 Va. 536, 32 S.E. 2d 720 (1935).
would not be fair to tell the jury that the action was for
their benefit and so appeal to its sympathy. It should
know the facts.
It was error to withhold this infoimation from the
jury but it was incidental error and had little to do
with the final judgment.
In substance the court was stating the same view as was
laid down later in Highway Express Lines v.J. C. Fleming Adm'r.,
Etc., 185 Va. 666.
However, this case was in a sense overruled by Miller v.
Tomlinson,9 and by the 1948 Amendment of 8-96 of the 1950
Code of Virginia. In the Miller case the plaintiffs delivered
their trucks to defendant's garage for repairs. The garage
burned and the trucks were destroyed. The plaintiffs filed
their notice of motion to recover the value of the trucks.
Before the jury was empanelled to try the case the defendants
moved that plaintiffs be required to endorse upon the notices
that any recovery would be for the benefit of the plaintiffs and
the insurance company which hid insured the trucks. The
effect of introducing the insurance company in this manner
was held to be prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs in this
case. The court on page 373 states:
At the 1948 session 8-96 of the 1950 Code was
amended by the addition of this sentence: 'Nothing in
this section shall be construed to permit the joinder, or
addition as a new party, of any insurance company on
account of the issuance to any party to a cause of any
policy or contract of liability insurance, or on account
of the issuance by any such company of any policy or
contract of liability insurance for the benefit of or that
will inure (to) the benefit of any party to any cause.'
Statute 8-96 covers the subject of nonjoinder and mis-
joinder of parties.
In the previously mentioned case of Highway Express
Lines v. Fleming, a witness, who was called primarily to dis-
9 194 Va. 367, 73 $.E. 2d 378 (1952).
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credit the testimony of some of the plaintiff's witnesses, was
a paid employee of the defendant's insurance company. He
denied that he had any interest in the outcome of the liti-
gation. Evidence of his employment was then held to be
admissible to show the interest, bias or prejudice of a hostile
witness.
The most recent decision covering the problem under
discussion in Virginia is the case of Simmons v. Boyd, which
was mentioned previously. This is a 1958 decision in which
the plaintiff was injured when the car in which she was a
passenger was struck by that driven by the defendant. In the
course of the trial the specialist who had treated the plaintiff
was asked by counsel for the defendant whether the doctor
who had referred the case wished him to see her from time to
time. To answer this the specialist read the letter of referral,
which included the statement "This is an insurance case."
At this point counsel for the defendant moved for a mistrial.
The court refused this request, and counsel for the defendant
did not request that the jury be instructed but excepted to
the court's ruling. The jury gave a verdict of $20,000 to the
plaintiff, which was the full amount asked for, after only a
short period of deliberation and without any positive evidence
that permanent damage had been suffered by the plaintiff.
The trial judge set aside the verdict on the basis that the jury
might have been improperly influenced by the mention of
insurance. At a second trial the question of insurance was
not brought out in the evidence and the jury awarded the
plaintiff a verdict of $6,500. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in a four to three decision reversed the lower court
and reinstated the first verdict for a $20,000 recovery. In
reaching its decision the Court of Appeals on page 813 quoted
Bourne v. Barlar, 17 Tenn. App. 375, 379, 67 S. W. 2d 751
(1933) as follows:
We think all these statements about insurance were
improper, but did they or were they liable to affect the
verdict? We think not. In this enlightened age it is
common knowledge, and everybody knows, that almost
every owner of an automobile carries liability in-
surance, hence everybody knows how it is obtained
NOTES
and the manner of protection. Each juror knows that
it is unjust and wrong to award a verdict against a
defendant simply because he may have insurance and
when he does so he stultifies himself and is unworthy
to sit as a juror. Each juror who has intelligence
enough to be a juror knows that when he, by his
verdict, unjustly takes money from a defendant, he
does him a very great wrong.
The court then states again on page 813:
While it is improper for the jury to be informed
that a defendant is insured against accident in an
action for negligence against him, yet such error
is harmless if the statement is unintentionally made and
it appears that substantial justice has been done in the case.
[Emphasis added]
The above statement very dearly lays down the Virginia
rule that when it is applied to the particular facts of the Simmons
case there arises doubt as to whether the first verdict should
have been reinstated. The result of the second trial in which
there was no mention of insurance suggests strongly that the
first jury might have been influenced improperly. In the
dissenting opinion on page 815 it is said:
There are three elements which I think dearly justi-
fied the court in setting aside the first verdict: (1) The
admission of evidence showing that the defendant
carried insurance; (2) the verdict was for the full amount
sued for when there was no proof that plaintiff had
sustained permanent injuries as alleged; and (3) the
immediate return of the verdict showed a lack of
deliberation.
While no one of these elements may be sufficient,
considered together they justified the trial judge (in
the exercise of the sound discretion vested in him) in
setting aside the verdict.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion the Virginia rule on this evidence problem
at the present time seems fairly dear in view of the statements
made by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in deciding
the various cases under discussion.
First of all, in Virginia, the fact that a defendant in a
negligence action is insured, is irrelevant and improper evi-
dence to be before a jury. If such evidence should be brought
to the attention of the jury the question then arises as to
whether it results in hamless error or prejudicial error which
prevents substantial justice from being done and thus consti-
tuting reversible error.
Secondly, if the question of insurance is brought out
accidentally and substantial justice has been done in the case,
then harmless error has been committed which will not
warrant a reversal. However, even if insurance has been brought
to the attention of the jury inadvertently or innocently, and
there is an indication that the jury was improperly influenced
thereby, then reversible error has been committed.
It appears that the same rules would govern even though
the insurance question be deliberately brought out as long
as there is a dear indication that substantial justice has been
done. However, the courts would find prejudicial error more
easily in cases of this type.
In view of the Simmons v. Boyd case and the fact that it is
common knowledge that practically all of the motor vehicles
in Virginia are insured, as a result of 46.1-167 of the 1950
Code of Virginia requiring all insured motorists to pay the
sum of $15.00 to the State, it is felt that the admission of
insurance coverage will not constitute reversible error ex-
cept in dear cases of improper influence upon a jury.
WILLIAM A. WRAY
